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THE OLIVER C. SCHROEDER, JR. SCHOLAR-INRESIDENCE LECTURE

PUBLIC CITIZEN’S ADVOCACY
CAMPAIGN OPPOSING FDA
APPROVAL OF ADUCANUMAB FOR
ALZHEIMER’S DISEASE: THE FIGHT
AGAINST REGULATORY CAPTURE†
Michael A. Carome, M.D.††
Good afternoon - I am honored to give this year’s Oliver C.
Schroeder, Jr. Scholar-in-Residence Lecture.
For 50 years, Public Citizen’s Health Research Group, which
was founded by my colleague Dr. Sidney Wolfe, has engaged in
independent, research-based advocacy targeting the Food and
Drug Administration (FDA) and the pharmaceutical industry. In
testimony before hundreds of FDA advisory committee meetings,
we have opposed approval of numerous new drugs that, in our
judgment, had unfavorable risk-benefit profiles. Through citizen
petitions to the FDA, we have sought the removal of more than
40 drug products from the market because they were too
dangerous and the addition of stronger warnings to the labeling
for several dozen other drugs. In many cases, the agency granted
our petitions.1
†

Edited from the annual Oliver C. Schroeder, Jr. Scholar-inResidence Lecture sponsored by the Law-Medicine Center on
October 4, 2021, at Case Western Reserve University School of
Law. This version has been edited for publishing purposes and does
not contain the lecture in its entirety. The full transcript is on file
with the editors of Health Matrix. Please direct all inquiries to hmatrix@case.edu.

††

Director, Public Citizen’s Health Research Group

1.

For examples of the Food and Drug Administration granting in full
or in part a petition from Public Citizen’s Health Research Group,
see Letter from Janet Woodcock, Dir., Ctr. for Drug Evaluation &
Rsch., to Sidney M. Wolfe, Pub. Citizen’s Health Rsch. Grp., (July
23, 2018) (on file with the U.S. Food & Drug Admin.) (granting in
part our December 6, 2017, petition to place cesium chloride on list
of bulk drug substances that present significant safety risks and
therefore may not be compounded under the agency’s interim
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Today, I would like to tell the story of drugmaker Biogen’s
development of aducanumab for the treatment of Alzheimer’s
disease; the FDA’s unprecedented, inappropriately close
collaboration with the company before and after the submission
of its biologics license application (BLA) for the drug; and the
agency’s subsequent approval of the drug under the Accelerated
Approval pathway.2 I will describe our group’s advocacy
campaign over the past year opposing FDA approval of
aducanumab and seeking to hold the agency accountable for its

guidance); Letter from Janet Woodcock, Dir., Ctr. for Drug
Evaluation & Rsch., to Sammy Almashat, Researcher, Pub.
Citizen’s Health Rsch. Grp. (Aug. 7, 2017) (on file with the U.S.
Food & Drug Admin.) (granting our December 21, 2016, petition
to require that the label of repaglinide-containing medications
include information on a serious drug-drug interaction with
clopidogrel that could result in severe hypoglycemia); Letter from
Janet Woodcock, Dir., Ctr. for Drug Evaluation & Rsch, to Sidney
M. Wolfe & Michael A. Carome, Pub. Citizen’s Health Rsch. Grp.
(Aug. 4, 2014) (on file with the U.S. Food & Drug Admin.)
(granting in part our Oct. 26, 2011, petition to require a boxed
warning in the label for the antibiotic Tygacil); Letter from Janet
Woodcock, Dir., Ctr. for Drug Evaluation & Rsch., to Eric Nellis
et al., Pub. Citizen’s Rsch. Grp. & Helge L. Waldum, Trondheim
University Hospital (Oct. 31, 2014) (on file with the U.S. Food &
Drug Admin.) (granting in part our August 23, 2011, petition to
require the addition of boxed warnings and other safety information
to the labels of all proton pump inhibitors); Letter from Janet
Woodcock, Dir., Ctr. for Drug Evaluation & Rsch., to Sidney M.
Wolfe, Dir., Pub. Citizen’s Health Rsch. Grp. (Jan. 5, 2011) (on
file with the U.S. Food & Drug Admin.) (granting our December
3, 2009, petition to ban the weight loss drug Meridia
(sibutramine)); Letter from Janet Woodcock, Dir., Ctr. for Drug
Evaluation & Rsch., to Arnold L. Widen & Babs Waldman, Ill.
Att’y Gen.’s Off. & Jay Parkinson & Sidney M. Wolfe, Pub.
Citizen’s Health Rsch. Grp. (July 24, 2008) (on file with the U.S.
Food & Drug Admin.) (granting in part our August 29, 2006,
petition to, among other things, add a boxed warning to the
product labeling of all fluoroquinolone antibiotics about the risk of
tendinopathy and tendon rupture).
2.

News Release, U.S. Food & Drug Admin., FDA Grants Accelerated
Approval for Alzheimer’s Drug (June 7, 2021), https://
www.fda.gov/news-events/press-announcements/fda-grantsaccelerated-approval-alzheimers-drug
[https://perma.cc/HT5GPQHU].
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inappropriately close collaboration with Biogen and for its
reckless decision to approve the drug — one of the worst decisions
in the agency’s history. I will present events regarding the
development and review of aducanumab as they become publicly
known. I will conclude with some reflections on how the FDA
reached this new low point as a regulatory agency.
Background on Aducanumab

Aducanumab is a recombinant human monoclonal antibody
targeting amyloid-beta multimers.3 The drug was developed
primarily by Biogen, in partnership with Eisai, as a treatment of
Alzheimer’s disease.4
Like the prior 22 unsuccessful experimental drugs targeting
amyloid-beta that were pursued as potential treatments for
Alzheimer’s disease over the past two decades, use of aducanumab
is predicated on the still-unproven “amyloid hypothesis,” which
was introduced in the early 1990s and posits that deposition of
amyloid plaques in the brain causes the neuronal degeneration
seen in Alzheimer’s disease.5
After completing two phase 1 trials of aducanumab (Study
101 and Study 103), Biogen in 2015 launched two identical phase
3, randomized, double-blind, placebo-controlled clinical trials to
evaluate the safety and efficacy of two dosing regimens of
aducanumab (Study 301 [ENGAGE] and Study 302
[EMERGE]).6 By early 2019, Studies 301 and 302 each had
3.

Francesco Panza et al., Emerging Drugs to Reduce Abnormal βamyloid Protein in Alzheimer’s Disease Patients, 21(4) EXPERT
OPINION ON EMERGING DRUGS 377, 385 (2016).

4.

Biogen and Eisai Discontinue Phase 3 ENGAGE and EMERGE
Trials of Aducanumab in Alzheimer’s Disease, BIOGEN (Mar. 21,
2019) [hereinafter Biogen and Eisai Discontinue Phase 3],
https://investors.biogen.com/news-releases/news-release-details/
biogen-and-eisai-discontinue-phase-3-engage-and-emerge-trials
[https://perma.cc/E7S6-GSDX].

5.

Abass Alavi et al., Suboptimal Validity of Amyloid Imaging-Based
Diagnosis and Management of Alzheimer’s Disease: Why it is Time
to Abandon the Approach, 47 EUR. J. NUCL. MED. MOL. IMAGING
2, 225-30 (2019).

6.

U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., COMBINED FDA AND APPLICANT PCNS
DRUGS ADVISORY COMMITTEE BRIEFING DOCUMENT (2020)
[hereinafter COMBINED FDA AND APPLICANT BRIEFING DOCUMENT].

33

Health Matrix·Volume 32·2022
Public Citizen's Advocacy Campaign Opposing FDA Approval of
Aducanumab for Alzheimer's Disease: The Fight Against Regulatory
Capture

enrolled approximately 1,650 subjects with mild cognitive
impairment attributed to Alzheimer’s disease or mild Alzheimer’s
disease dementia.7
On March 21, 2019, Biogen and its partner Eisai announced
the decision to terminate both pivotal phase 3 trials after a
prespecified interim futility analysis by an independent datamonitoring committee indicated that the trials were unlikely to
meet their primary efficacy endpoint upon completion.8 That
action should have marked the end of aducanumab as a potential
treatment for Alzheimer’s disease, at least as it pertained to the
studies thus far completed.
Subsequent Unprecedented Close Collaboration Between the FDA
and Biogen

Following this, on October 22, 2019, Biogen shocked the
medical community when it announced in another press release
plans to seek FDA approval for aducanumab based on a series of
post hoc analyses of data from Studies 301 and 302, including
additional data collected after the announced termination of the
trials.9 The company stated in the press release that new analyses
had been “conducted by Biogen in consultation with the FDA.”10
On December 5, 2019, Biogen presented topline results of
Studies 301 and 302 at the Clinical Trials on Alzheimer’s Disease
2019 conference. The post hoc analyses conducted by Biogen in
collaboration with the FDA showed that in Study 301
aducanumab at both the low and high dosing regimens did not
show improvement in the trial’s primary efficacy endpoint,
whereas in Study 302 the drug at only the high dosing regimen
resulted in small, statistically significant — but not clinically
meaningful — improvement in the primary efficacy endpoint.11
7.

Id.

8.

Biogen and Eisai Discontinue Phase 3, supra note 4.

9.

Biogen Plans Regulatory Filing for Aducanumab in Alzheimer’s
Disease Based a New Analysis of Larger Dataset From Phase 3
Studies, BIOGEN (Oct. 22, 2019), https://investors.biogen.com/
news-releases/news-release-details/biogen-plans-regulatory-filingaducanumab-alzheimers-disease [https://perma.cc/LG4M-ACHT].

10.

Id.

11.

EMERGE and ENGAGE Topline Results: Two Phase 3 Studies to
Evaluate Aducanumab in Patients with Early Alzheimer’s Disease,
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In a July 8, 2020, press release publicizing the completion of
its BLA submission for aducanumab to the FDA, Biogen noted
that the “submission followed ongoing collaboration with the
FDA.”12
On November 4, 2020, the FDA posted on its website the
briefing documents for the agency’s Peripheral and Central
Nervous System (PCNS) Drugs Advisory Committee meeting on
November 6, 2020. Disturbingly, the primary briefing document
for the meeting had been written jointly by the FDA and Biogen,
with most content apparently written by the company.13
In our experience attending or participating in hundreds of
FDA advisory committee meetings, we could not recall ever
seeing an advisory committee meeting briefing document that was
explicitly written jointly by the FDA and the sponsor of the
medical product being considered by the committee.
The joint advisory committee briefing document revealed
further details of the close collaboration that had occurred
between the FDA and Biogen following the company’s March
2019 decision to terminate the phase 3 trials of aducanumab. For
example, the briefing document stated that Biogen had a June
2019 meeting with the FDA that included a discussion of post
hoc analyses of data from Study 302 conducted after termination
of the study showing apparently positive results.14 According to
Biogen, the FDA stated the following at this meeting:
It is imperative that extensive resources be brought to bear
on achieving a maximum understanding of the existing
data. Given the wholly unique situation that is the current
state of the aducanumab development program . . . , those
BIOGEN (Dec. 5, 2019), https://investors.biogen.com/static-files/
ddd45672-9c7e-4c99-8a06-3b557697c06f [https://perma.cc/8KA567KM].
12.

Biogen Completes Submission of Biologics Licensing Application to
FDA for Aducanumab as a Treatment for Alzheimer’s Disease,
BIOGEN (July 8, 2020), https://investors.biogen.com/newsreleases/news-release-details/biogen-completes-submissionbiologics-license-application-fda [https://perma.cc/6PL4-2BXZ].

13.

COMBINED FDA
6.

14.

Id.

AND

APPLICANT BRIEFING DOCUMENT, supra note
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further analyses would best be conducted as part of a
bilateral effort involving the Agency and sponsor, i.e.,
through a ‘workstream’ or a ‘working group’
collaboration.15

Of note, key details regarding the extent of this FDA-Biogen
collaboration would not become known until after the FDA
approved aducanumab in June 2021.
Typically, sponsors conduct their own statistical analyses of
clinical trial data supporting new drug applications (NDAs) and
BLAs, and the FDA then conducts its own independent analyses
of the data following submission of these applications for
approval. Such appropriate separation between the clinical trial
data analyses conducted by the sponsor and those conducted by
the FDA is critical to maintaining the independence and integrity
of the FDA’s review of the data.
In the case of aducanumab, the close collaboration between
the FDA and Biogen in the post hoc analyses of clinical trial data
and the subsequent joint authorship of the primary briefing
document for the November 6, 2020, PCNS Drugs Advisory
Committee meeting resulted in a one-sided consensus briefing
document.16 That document overwhelmingly emphasized the post
hoc analyses that yielded positive results suggesting that highdose aducanumab was an effective treatment for Alzheimer’s
disease (primarily the analyses of Study 302), but significantly
downplayed the results of post hoc analyses showing that
aducanumab was not effective for treating Alzheimer’s disease
(the analyses of Study 301).
The FDA characterized the results of Study 302 as being
“highly persuasive,” “strongly positive,” and “capable of
providing the primary contribution to a demonstration of
substantial evidence of effectiveness of aducanumab,” while
simply acknowledging that Study 301 was a “negative study.”17
Note that the FDA’s usual standards for approval of new
drugs include “substantial evidence of effectiveness,” which
generally requires demonstration of effectiveness in two, well15.

Id.

16.

Id.

17.

Id.
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designed, completed, randomized, phase 3 clinical trials,
particularly for drugs used to treat common diseases like
Alzheimer’s disease.18
Relying on dubious statistical gymnastics, Biogen and the
FDA in their joint review document sought to discount the
discordance between the negative results of Study 301 and the
partially positive results of Study 302 and portray the post hoc
analyses of Study 302 data (with supporting data from the small
phase 1 Study 103 that was not even designed to assess efficacy,
but did assess safety and the effect of aducanumab on brain
amyloid-beta) as representing the true picture of aducanumab’s
effectiveness in treating Alzheimer’s disease. This “cherrypicking” approach was neither statistically nor scientifically
appropriate.
Appended to the joint briefing document for the PCNS Drugs
Advisory Committee meeting was a draft statistical review
document written by FDA Mathematical Statistician Tristan
Massie, Ph.D., that highlighted numerous serious flaws in the
post hoc data analyses of Studies 301, 302, and 103 that had been
conducted by Biogen in collaboration with other FDA staff.19 Dr.
Massie made the following conclusions:
The totality of the data does not seem to provide sufficient
evidence to support the efficacy of the high dose. There is
much inconsistency and no replication. There is only one
positive study at best and a second study which directly
conflicts with the positive study. Both studies were not
fully completed . . . and had sporadic unblinding for dose
management
of
ARIA
[amyloid-related
imaging
abnormalities] cases[,] which was much higher in the
[aducanumab] group . . . there is no convincing evidence of
delaying clinical progression.20

18.

U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., DEMONSTRATING SUBSTANTIAL
EVIDENCE OF EFFECTIVENESS FOR HUMAN DRUG AND BIOLOGICAL
PRODUCTS, GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY (DRAFT) (2019).

19.

COMBINED FDA
6.

20.

Id.

AND

APPLICANT BRIEFING DOCUMENT, supra note
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Unsurprisingly, the prerecorded and live presentations by
Biogen and all FDA reviewers, except the FDA statistician Dr.
Massie, for the PCNS Drugs Advisory Committee meeting were
completely concordant with the one-sided joint briefing
document. Dr. Billy Dunn, Director, Office of Neuroscience,
Office of New Drugs, Center for Drug Evaluation and Research
(CDER) — whose office is responsible for reviewing Alzheimer’s
disease drugs — gave the FDA’s summary presentation at the
meeting.21 The language he used, as reflected in the following
representative excerpts, made him sound more like a consultant
hired by Biogen to endorse the company’s BLA for aducanumab,
than like an independent and objective federal regulator paid by
American taxpayers:
The effect of aducanumab in Study 302 is robust and
exceptionally persuasive on several of the instruments
used to evaluate efficacy . . . 22
When considered on its own, Study 302 would appear to
be a home run . . . 23

During the meeting, advisory committee members unleashed
a torrent of appropriately harsh criticism of the post hoc analyses
of Studies 301, 302, and 103; the nature and organization of the
questions posed by the FDA; and the one-sided joint briefing
document.
For example, Scott Emerson, M.D., Ph.D., Professor
Emeritus of Biostatistics, University of Washington, Seattle,
Washington,24 said the following:
21.

U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN. CTR. DRUG EVALUATION & RSCH.,
FINAL SUMMARY MINUTES OF THE PERIPHERAL AND CENTRAL
NERVOUS SYSTEM DRUGS ADVISORY COMMITTEE MEETING (2020)
[hereinafter MEETING SUMMARY MINUTES).

22.

U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., MEETING OF THE PERIPHERAL AND
CENTRAL NERVOUS SYSTEM DRUGS ADVISORY COMMITTEE
WEBCAST RECORDING (2020) [hereinafter MEETING WEBCAST
RECORDING],
https://collaboration.fda.gov/p2uew93ez7dw/
[https://perma.cc/KUK5-KW5S] (available at 02:12:36-02:12:43).

23.

Id. (available at 02:17:01-02:17:06).

24.

U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN. CTR. DRUG EVALUATION & RSCH.,
PERIPHERAL AND CENTRAL NERVOUS SYSTEM DRUGS ADVISORY
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This analysis seems to be subject to the Texas
sharpshooter fallacy, a name for the joke of someone first
firing a shotgun at a barn and then painting a target around
the bullet holes.25

Likewise, G. Caleb Alexander, M.D., M.S., Professor of
Epidemiology and Medicine,26 Johns Hopkins Bloomberg School
of Public Health, Center for Drug Safety and Effectiveness,
Baltimore, Maryland, offered the following comment:
I find the materials that the FDA has provided strikingly
incongruent, and I have a very hard time
understanding . . . how the FDA could conclude that
there are substantial evidence of effectiveness and, in
particular, that Study 302 provides ‘a robust and
exceptionally persuasive study,’ and it just feels to me
like the audio and the video on the TV are out of sync.
And there are literally a dozen different red threads that
suggest concerns about the consistency of evidence.27
Our Advocacy Work Opposing FDA Approval of Aducanumab and
Seeking to Hold FDA Accountable for its Inappropriately Close
Collaboration with Biogen Prior to FDA Approval of the Drug

Our advocacy work opposing FDA approval of aducanumab
began on November 5, 2020, with a press statement previewing
our testimony before the FDA’s PCNS Drugs Advisory
Committee the following day. The statement noted that “[t]he
overall tenor of the FDA’s briefing document for [the] meeting
reveals that the agency is actively working hand-in-hand with
Biogen . . . to rush to market an unproven biologic drug to treat

COMMITTEE
ROSTER].

MEETING

ROSTER

(2020)

[hereinafter

MEETING

25.

MEETING WEBCAST RECORDING, supra note 22 (available at
01:00:28-01:00:39).

26.

MEETING ROSTER, supra note 24.

27.

MEETING WEBCAST RECORDING, supra note 22 (available at
03:35:28-03:36:15).
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Alzheimer’s disease that could bankrupt our health care
system.”28
In our testimony before the PCNS Drugs Advisory
Committee on November 6, we urged the committee to
recommend that the FDA not approve aducanumab for treatment
of Alzheimer’s disease.29 We argued that the post hoc analyses of
the phase 3 clinical trials of the drug had been highly susceptible
to bias, had not provided substantial evidence of effectiveness,
and should only have been used to generate hypotheses for
possible future trials. We highlighted the FDA statistical
reviewer’s statement in his prerecorded presentation that “if we
select only the better study, our [efficacy] estimate is very likely
biased,
and
we
already
know
not
consistently
repeatable . . . Thus, excluding data from a large trial without
sufficient justification is unscientific, statistically inappropriate
and misleading.” We concluded that the FDA must demand
another large premarket randomized, placebo-controlled trial of
aducanumab and that FDA approval of the drug, absent
substantial evidence of efficacy, would further damage the
agency’s already diminished credibility.
On the key voting question posed to the advisory committee
— In light of the understanding provided by the exploratory
analyses of Study 301 and Study 302, along with the results of
Study 103 and evidence of pharmacodynamic effect on
Alzheimer’s disease pathophysiology, is it reasonable to consider
Study 302 as primary evidence of effectiveness of aducanumab for
the treatment of Alzheimer’s disease? — the vote was 0 YES, 10

28.

Press Statement, Pub. Citizen, FDA Approval of Aducanumab to
Treat Alzheimer’s Disease Would Be a Reckless Disregard for
Science, Damage Agency’s Credibility (Nov. 5, 2020), https://
www.citizen.org/news/fda-approval-of-aducanumab-to-treatalzheimers-disease-would-be-a-reckless-disregard-for-sciencedamage-agencys-credibility/ [https://perma.cc/9UMU-ZM78].

29.

Michael A. Carome, Testimony Before The FDA’s Peripheral and
Central Nervous System Drugs Advisory Committee: The FDA
Must Reject BLA 761178 for Aducanumab for the Treatment of
Alzheimer’s Disease, PUB. CITIZEN’S HEALTH RSCH. GRP. (Nov. 6,
2020),
https://www.citizen.org/wp-content/uploads/2556.pdf
[https://perma.cc/5ZQB-VPG6].
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NO, 1 UNCERTAIN,30 formally indicating near-unanimous
opposition to FDA approval of aducanumab based on the
available clinical trial data — opposition that was readily
apparent throughout the meeting.
Following the meeting, we were hopeful that the advisory
committee’s overwhelming negative assessment of the
aducanumab data would be the death knell for Biogen’s BLA.
We also concluded that there must be an independent
investigation of the unprecedented close collaboration that had
occurred between the FDA and Biogen before and after the
submission of the company’s BLA for aducanumab. Therefore, on
December 9, 2020, we submitted a formal, detailed complaint to
the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) Office
of Inspector General (OIG) calling for such an investigation.31
Citing the aforementioned details of the FDA-Biogen
collaboration, we asserted that this collaboration dangerously
compromised the independence and objectivity of senior staff and
clinical reviewers in CDER’s Office of Neuroscience during the
agency’s review of Biogen’s BLA for aducanumab and key data
from the clinical trials of the drug, which resulted in the FDA’s
unbridled enthusiasm for the drug. We noted that Office of
Neuroscience Director Dunn “likely played a key role in the close
FDA-Biogen collaboration.”32 We also argued that the FDA’s
close collaboration with Biogen was indicative of regulatory
capture at the agency, which has resulted in the agency acting in
ways that benefit the interests of the pharmaceutical industry
rather than the public interest.33

30.

MEETING SUMMARY MINUTES, supra note 21.

31.

Letter from Michael A. Carome, Dir., Pub. Citizen’s Health Rsch.
Grp., to Christi A. Grimm, Principal Deputy Inspector General,
Off. of Inspector General, U.S. Dept. of Health & Human Services
(Dec. 9, 2020) (on file with Pub. Citizen’s Health Rsch. Grp.)
[hereinafter Letter from Carome to Grimm](requesting an Office of
Inspector General investigation of the Food and Drug
Administration’s inappropriate close collaboration with Biogen
before and after the submission of the biologics license application
for aducanumab for treatment of Alzheimer’s disease).

32.

Id.

33.

Id.
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We listed for the OIG three major adverse consequences if
the FDA were to approve aducanumab. First, approving a drug
for Alzheimer’s disease that has not been shown to be effective
would provide false hope to millions of desperate patients with
the disease and their families. Second, because the drug would be
exorbitantly priced and used by potentially millions of patients
for years, it would have a massive impact on health-care
economics and potentially bankrupt the Medicare program, as
well as many patients and their families. Third, the premature
approval of aducanumab could impede the development of other
experimental treatments for Alzheimer’s disease for many years,
potentially delaying progress on drugs that actually may turn out
to be beneficial.
Also on December 9, we sent a separate letter to then-FDA
Commissioner Stephen Hahn and then-Acting CDER Director
(and now CDER Director) Patrizia Cavazzoni transmitting a
copy of our letter to the HHS OIG and urging them to begin
restoring public confidence in their agency and its review of
aducanumab by taking the following actions:
(1) Endorse our call for an OIG investigation; (2) Assign
all further review and decision-making related to the
BLA for aducanumab to CDER staff who were not
involved in this close collaboration with Biogen; (3)
Given that he supervised the FDA team reviewing the
BLA for aducanumab and likely played a key role in the
close collaboration with Biogen, temporarily remove Dr.
Dunn from his position as Office of Neuroscience
Director until the requested OIG investigation is
completed; and (4) Assess whether any similar close
collaborations have occurred with other sponsors that
submitted NDAs or BLAs to the FDA, and if so,
determine the extent to which the integrity of the review
of those NDAs or BLAs had been compromised.34

34.

Letter from Michael A. Carome, Dir., Pub. Citizen’s Health Rsch.
Grp., to Stephen M. Hahn, Commissioner, Food & Drug Admin.,
and Patrizia Cavazzoni, Acting Dir., Center for Drug Evaluation
& Rsch., U.S. Food & Drug Admin. (Dec. 9, 2020) (on file with
Pub. Citizen’s Health Rsch. Grp.) (discussing the FDA’s
inappropriate close collaboration with Biogen before and after the
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In our letter to the FDA, we also pressed that agency to take
additional actions to prevent future inappropriate collaborations
between agency staff and sponsors:
As noted in our letter to the HHS OIG, we understand that
it is not unusual for the FDA to meet with sponsors and
provide advice regarding the development of drugs and
biologics, the design of clinical trials, and the statistical
analyses of trial data, among other things. Given the
potential for these interactions to drift towards
collaborations with sponsors that could undermine the
integrity of agency reviews, as had occurred with
aducanumab, the FDA in such cases should designate other
staff, who were not involved in such interactions prior to
the submission of an NDA or BLA, to review and make
decisions on any subsequent NDAs and BLAs related to
those drugs or biologics. To ensure the integrity of these
reviews and decisions, a firewall should be created between
the FDA staff involved in any presubmission interactions
and those involved in the postsubmission NDA or BLA
review and decision-making.35

Finally, we again urged the agency not to approve
aducanumab.
The OIG on January 11, 2021 responded to us with a short
pro forma letter stating, in part, the following:
Safeguarding public health is one of the Department’s
Top Management and Performance Challenges, and OIG
has responded by focusing on work that identifies
opportunities to, among other things, ensure the
integrity of agency review and decision making. OIG
continuously engages in work planning and will include
the collaboration issues you have raised in our ongoing
work planning discussions.36

submission of the biologics license application for aducanumab for
treatment of Alzheimer’s disease).
35.

Id.

36.

Letter from Christopher S. Seagle, Dir. External Affairs, Office of
Inspector General, Dept. of Health & Human Services, to Michael
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This initial response fell far short of committing to the type
of OIG investigation that we had sought.
On January 28, 2021, we sent Dr. Janet Woodcock — shortly
after her appointment as Acting FDA Commissioner — a letter
identical to our December 9 missive to Drs. Hahn and
Cavazzoni.37 On February 11, 2021, Dr. Woodcock responded
with a full-throated defense of the FDA’s interactions with
pharmaceutical companies during the drug development process.38
She extolled the benefits of these interactions and ignored their
potential downsides, which had been apparent in the agency’s
review of aducanumab.39
On January 29, 2021, Biogen and Eisai unexpectedly
announced that the FDA had extended the review period for the
companies’ marketing application for aducanumab by three
months (the planned decision date delayed from March 7 until
June 7, 2021) after the agency had requested more data on the
drug.40 Worried that the FDA was searching for a way to approve
aducanumab following the strong opposition to approval from its
advisory committee, we promptly issued a press statement
reiterating our position that the FDA should reject the
application for aducanumab and demand that Biogen and Eisai
conduct another large, placebo-controlled clinical trial before
A. Carome, Dir., Pub. Citizen Health Rsch. Grp. (Jan. 11, 2021)
(on file with Pub. Citizen’s Health Rsch. Grp.).
37.

Letter from Michael A. Carome, Dir., Pub. Citizen’s Health Rsch.
Grp., to Janet Woodcock, Acting Commissioner, U.S. Food & Drug
Admin. (Jan. 28, 2021) (on file with Pub. Citizen’s Health Rsch.
Grp.).

38.

Letter from Janet Woodcock, Acting Commissioner, U.S. Food &
Drug Admin., to Michael A. Carome, Dir., Public Citizen’s Health
Rsch. Grp. (Feb. 11, 2021) (on file with Pub. Citizen’s Health Rsch.
Grp.).

39.

Id.

40.

Biogen And Eisai Announce FDA’s 3-Month Extension of Review
Period for the Biologics License Application for Aducanumab,
BIOGEN, https://www.globenewswire.com/news-release/2021/01/
29/2166560/0/en/Biogen-and-Eisai-Announce-FDA-s-3-MonthExtension-of-Review-Period-for-the-Biologics-License-Applicationfor-Aducanumab.html
[https://perma.cc/9XH6-4VNW]
(last
visited Feb. 27, 2022).
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giving further consideration to approving the drug to treat
Alzheimer’s disease.41
Of note, through press releases and persistent media outreach
during our advocacy campaign, we were able to partially frame
the public debate regarding whether aducanumab should be
approved by the FDA based on the available data and to bring
public attention to our concern that the integrity of the FDA’s
review of the drug had been compromised by the agency’s
inappropriately close collaboration with Biogen.
We also wrote a letter to Secretary of Health and Human
Services (“HHS”) Xavier Becerra on April 1, 2021, two weeks
after he had been confirmed by the Senate, urging him to ask his
department’s OIG to immediately investigate the FDA-Biogen
collaboration.42 We also warned that approval of aducanumab for
treatment of Alzheimer’s disease despite the lack of evidence of
effectiveness would pose an unacceptable threat to the financial
health of the Medicare program.43 We asserted that “[g]iven the
gravity of our concerns, more definitive, prompter actions by the
OIG and HHS must be taken.”44
Our Advocacy Work Seeking to Hold FDA Accountable For its
Reckless Decision to approve aducanumab

Disappointingly, we were unsuccessful in stopping FDA
approval of aducanumab. On June 7, 2021, the agency announced
its decision to approve the drug under the brand name Aduhelm
to treat patients with Alzheimer’s disease using the Accelerated

41.

Statement: FDA Must Demand a New Clinical Trial of
Experimental Alzheimer’s Disease Treatment Following
Inappropriate Collaboration, PUB. CITIZEN (Jan. 29, 2021),
https://www.citizen.org/news/statement-fda-must-demand-a-newclinical-trial-of-experimental-alzheimers-disease-treatmentfollowing-inappropriate-collaboration/
[https://perma.cc/NJT4PXL9].

42.

Letter from Michael A. Carome, Dir., Pub. Citizen’s Health Rsch.
Grp., to Xavier Becerra, Sec’y, Health & Human Serv. (Apr. 1,
2021) (on file with Pub. Citizen’s Health Rsch. Grp.).

43.
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44.

Id.
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Approval pathway.45 The agency claimed that the reduction in
amyloid-beta plaques in the brains of subjects who received
aducanumab in clinical trials — a surrogate endpoint — was
“reasonably likely to result in clinical benefit.”46 The FDA
mandated that Biogen complete a postmarket, randomized,
placebo-controlled trial of the drug within 9 years.47
We immediately shifted our advocacy work to holding the
FDA accountable for its reckless decision to approve
aducanumab. Shortly after the FDA’s announcement, we released
a press statement condemning the decision and noting that it
showed “a stunning disregard for science and eviscerate[ed] the
agency’s standards for approving new drugs” and that “[b]ecause
of this reckless action, the agency’s credibility has been
irreparably damaged.”48
The FDA’s decision to approve aducanumab, combined with
Biogen’s announced price of $56,000 for a one-year treatment
course of the drug,49 sparked fierce backlash from many
neurologists, academics, and Congress, among others, and
prompted three members of the agency’s PCNS Drugs Advisory
45.

Patrizia Cavazzoni, FDA’s Decision to Approve New Treatment
for Alzheimer’s Disease, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN. (June 7, 2021),
https://www.fda.gov/drugs/news-events-human-drugs/fdasdecision-approve-new-treatment-alzheimers-disease
[https://
perma.cc/D3LG-MAYL].

46.

Id.

47.

Letter from Billy Dunn, Dir., Off. Of Neuroscience, Ctr. for Drug
Evaluation & Rsch., to Priya Singhal, Vice Pres., Global Safety &
Regulatory Sci., Biogen, Inc. (June 7, 2021) (on file with U.S. Food
& Drug Admin.).

48.

Press Statement, Pub. Citizen, FDA’s Decision to Approve
Aducanumab for Alzheimer’s Disease Shows Reckless Disregard
For Science, Severely Damages Agency’s Credibility (June 7, 2021),
https://www.citizen.org/news/statement-fdas-decision-toapprove-aducanumab-for-alzheimers-disease-shows-recklessdisregard-for-science-severely-damages-agencys-credibility/
[https://perma.cc/3SDV-2K4Y].

49.

Biogen and Eisai Launch Multiple Initiatives to Help Patients with
Alzheimer’s Disease Access Aduhelm, BIOGEN (June 7, 2021),
https://investors.biogen.com/news-releases/news-release-details/
biogen-and-eisai-launch-multiple-initiatives-help-patients
[https://perma.cc/XXK3-XMAN].
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Committee to resign from the committee.50 Many health insurers
refused to cover the drug, and some health care systems, including
the Cleveland Clinic, announced that they would not provide the
drug to patients.51
On June 16, 2021, we again wrote to HHS Secretary Becerra
and urged him to request the resignations or seek the removal of
the three officials most responsible for the agency’s indefensible
decision to approve aducanumab for treatment of Alzheimer’s
disease, despite the lack of evidence that the drug provided any
meaningful clinical benefit, plus the fact that the drug had a welldocumented risk of potentially serious brain injury: Acting FDA
Commissioner Woodcock, CDER Director Cavazzoni, and
CDER’s Office of Neuroscience Director Dunn.52 In our letter, we
emphasized that the currently available evidence — including
evidence from the clinical trials of aducanumab itself — failed to
show a meaningful correlation between changes in brain amyloidbeta and changes in clinical measures of cognitive function. We
also highlighted the fact that during the November 6, 2020 PCNS
Drugs Advisory Committee meeting, in response to a question
from one committee member about the lack of correlation
between the observed changes in amyloid-beta plaques in the
brain and changes in measures of cognitive function in the clinical
trials of aducanumab, Dr. Dunn explicitly stated that the agency
was “not using the amyloid as a surrogate [endpoint] for

50.

Bill Chappell, 3 Experts Have Resigned from an FDA Committee
Over Alzheimer’s Drug Approval, NPR (June 11, 2021), https://
www.npr.org/2021/06/11/1005567149/3-experts-have-resignedfrom-an-fda-committee-over-alzheimers-drug-approval
[https://perma.cc/5J8N-8UTY].

51.

Aducanumab
FAQ,
CLEVELAND
CLINIC,
https://my.
clevelandclinic.org/departments/neurological/depts/brain-health/
aducanumab-faq#:~:text=Based%20on%20the%20current%
20data,for%20use%20in%20our%20patients
[https://perma.cc/
66TQ-XY2W] (last visited Feb. 27, 2022).
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Letter from Michael A. Carome, Dir., Pub. Citizen’s Health Rsch.
Grp., to Xavier Becerra, Sec’y, Health & Human Services (June 16,
2021) (on file with Pub. Citizen’s Health Rsch. Grp.).
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efficacy.”53 Finally, we expressed dismay that the agency had
approved the drug for anyone with Alzheimer’s disease despite
that fact the phase 3 clinical trials of the drug had been limited
to patients with no more than mild Alzheimer’s disease and, thus,
there was a complete absence of any evidence that the drug was
safe or effective for patients with moderate or severe Alzheimer’s
disease.
On June 25, the Chairs of the U.S. House of Representatives’
Committee on Energy and Commerce and Committee on
Oversight and Reform announced a joint investigation into the
FDA’s review and approval of aducanumab.54 Shortly thereafter,
we met with staff from the committees to share our concerns
regarding the FDA-Biogen collaboration before and after the
company submitted its marketing application for the drug.
Then, on June 29, 2021, the online media outlet STAT
published a detailed exposé that provided stunning new
disclosures about the extent to which key FDA staff in CDER’s
Office of Neuroscience collaborated with Biogen after the
company terminated the phase 3 clinical trials of aducanumab in
March 2019.55 Among the most troubling disclosures in the STAT
article were the following:
1.

In early May 2019 — shortly after Biogen and Eisai had
announced the decisions to terminate the two pivotal
phase 3 clinical trials testing aducanumab and to end
development of the drug — Biogen Chief Scientist, Al
Sandrock, reached out to CDER’s ON Director, Dr.

53.

U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., PERIPHERAL & CENTRAL NERVOUS
SYSTEM DRUGS ADVISORY COMMITTEE (PCNS) MEETING
TRANSCRIPT (2020).

54.

Press Release, House Comm. on Oversight & Reform, Chairs
Maloney and Pallone Announce Investigation of Biogen’s
Alzheimer’s Drug Aduhelm (June 25, 2021), https://oversight.
house.gov/news/press-releases/chairs-maloney-and-palloneannounce-investigation-of-biogen-s-alzheimer-s-drug
[https://
perma.cc/RN6R-RQQ8].

55.

Adam Feuerstein et al., Inside ‘Project Onyx’: How Biogen Used
an FDA Back Channel to Win Approval of its Polarizing
Alzheimer’s Drug, STAT (June 29, 2021), https://www.
statnews.com/2021/06/29/biogen-fda-alzheimers-drug-approvaladuhelm-project-onyx/ [https://perma.cc/LXD2-HJ93].

48

Health Matrix·Volume 32·2022
Public Citizen's Advocacy Campaign Opposing FDA Approval of
Aducanumab for Alzheimer's Disease: The Fight Against Regulatory
Capture
Dunn, with whom Sandrock “already had a
longstanding professional relationship,” and sat down
with him for an “off-the-books” meeting while the two
were attending a neurology conference in Philadelphia.56
“Sandrock wanted to let Dunn know that Aduhelm —
publicly declared ineffective — might actually be
slowing the progression of Alzheimer’s . . . And wanted
to know if Dunn would be open to helping find a way to
get the drug approved.”57

2. “‘It was clear that Billy Dunn was an ally, so the job for
Biogen became figuring out how to support his efforts
within the FDA,’ a former Biogen employee told
STAT.”58
3. Following Sandrock’s meeting with Dunn, Biogen
“mounted a secret campaign, codenamed ‘Project
Onyx,’ to resurrect the drug and convince the FDA to
give it the green light. Central to their mission was an
inside ally: Billy Dunn, the agency’s top regulator of
Alzheimer’s drugs.”59
4. “The FDA’s support grew quickly. By June 2019, only
a month after the crucial meeting with Dunn, agency
officials in his Office of Neuroscience were so willing to
advance Aduhelm that they proposed as one option a
regulatory shortcut called ‘accelerated approval,’
according to meeting minutes read to STAT. The move
stunned even Biogen’s top executives, who had
considered that out of the question for a host of
reasons.”60
5. “After the June 14, 2019, meeting [between Biogen and
the FDA], Biogen and the FDA established a ‘working
group collaboration’ consisting of company employees
and agency review staff. The group met or
56.

Id.

57.

Id.

58.

Id.

59.

Id.

60.

Id.

49

Health Matrix·Volume 32·2022
Public Citizen's Advocacy Campaign Opposing FDA Approval of
Aducanumab for Alzheimer's Disease: The Fight Against Regulatory
Capture
communicated almost daily in June, July, and August
of 2019, working to collect and analyze Aduhelm data
for inclusion in the planned marketing submission. The
group decided to pursue a standard FDA approval based
on data on how patients had fared on cognitive
surveys.”61

The following day, June 30, 2021, we sent follow-up letters to
the HHS OIG renewing our request for an independent
investigation of the unprecedented FDA-Biogen collaboration62
and to HHS Secretary Becerra again, calling for the resignations
or removal of Acting Commissioner Woodcock and other senior
FDA officials.63 Both letters asserted that the circumstances
described in the STAT exposé, if confirmed, painted a damning
picture of FDA drug regulators who had surrendered their
independence and objectivity, essentially began working on behalf
of Biogen, and fostered regulatory capture at the agency.
On July 9, 2021, Dr. Woodcock surprisingly announced via
Twitter that she had asked the HHS Acting Inspector General to
independently review the “interactions between representatives of
Biogen and the FDA during the process that led to the decision
to approve” aducanumab for treatment of Alzheimer’s
disease.64 We responded that same day with a press statement
welcoming Dr. Woodcock’s belated request for an independent IG
investigation of her agency’s inappropriately close collaboration
with Biogen, as we had urged her to do nearly six months earlier,

61.

Id.

62.

Letter from Michael A. Carome, Dir., Pub. Citizen’s Health Rsch.
Grp., to Christi A. Grimm, Principal Deputy Inspector General,
Off. of Inspector General, U.S. Dept. of Health & Human Serv.
(June 30, 2021) (on file with Pub. Citizen’s Health Rsch. Grp).

63.

Letter from Michael A. Carome, Dir., Pub. Citizen’s Health Rsch.
Grp., to Xavier Becerra, Sec’y, Health & Human Services (June 30,
2021) (on file with Pub. Citizen’s Health Rsch. Grp.).

64.

@DrWoodcockFDA, TWITTER (July 9, 2021), https://twitter.com/
DrWoodcockFDA/status/1413540801934774283 [https://perma.
cc/98SZ-LJR2].
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and noting that the requested OIG investigation must examine
the role that Dr. Woodcock played in the matter.65
On August 4, 2021, the HHS OIG finally announced that in
response to concerns raised about the FDA’s process for reviewing
and approving aducanumab — including “allegations of an
inappropriately close relationship between the FDA and the
industry”66 — the OIG would review and assess how the FDA
implemented the accelerated approval pathway for this drug and
a sample of other drugs approved under this regulatory
pathway.67 That review will include an examination of the
interactions between the FDA and “outside parties” [i.e., Biogen
and other drug company personnel] during the review and
approval process of these drugs. This was exactly the type of
investigation that we had requested in our original December 9,
2020, letter to the OIG.68 The OIG expects to issue its report in
2023.69
Concluding Reflections: How Did the FDA Sink So Low?

The FDA-Biogen collaboration regarding aducanumab and
the agency’s subsequent decision to approve the drug under the
Accelerated Approval pathway exemplify the regulatory capture
at the agency by the pharmaceutical industry. So how did we
reach this point?
The origins of the FDA’s decline as a pharmaceutical industry
regulator date back to 1992 when Congress first passed the
65.

Press Statement, Pub. Citizen, Woodcock’s Role in Aducanumab’s
Approval Must Be Investigated as Part of IG Probe (July 9, 2021),
https://www.citizen.org/news/statement-woodcocks-role-inaducanumabs-approval-must-be-investigated-as-part-of-ig-probe/
[https://perma.cc/P2NK-UBSC].

66.

Review of the FDA’s Accelerated Approval Pathway, U.S. DEPT.
HEALTH & HUMAN SERV. OFF. INSPECTOR GEN. [hereinafter Review
of the FDA’s Accelerated Approval Pathway], https://oig.hhs.gov/
reports-and-publications/workplan/summary/wp-summary0000608.asp [https://perma.cc/3LA5-JWAR] (last visited Feb. 27,
2022).
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Letter from Carome to Grimm, supra note 31.
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Review of the FDA’s Accelerated Approval Pathway, supra note
66.
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Prescription Drug Use Fee Act (PDUFA).70 PDUFA was intended
to expedite the drug review process by providing the FDA with
a new funding stream to hire additional medical officers and other
staff to review NDAs. In exchange for this industry funding —
which across all FDA user fee programs totaled nearly $1.2 billion
dollars in fiscal year 2020 for review and oversight of human
drugs71 — Congress required that the FDA meet benchmarks for
timeliness of review and final decision making for drug marketing
applications.
In addition, each five-year reauthorization of PDUFA has
provided an opportunity for drug companies and their well-paid
advocates to lobby Congress for additional legislative provisions
that have, and have had, nothing to do the actual user fees, but
instead weakened the standards for approving new drugs. For
example, PDUFA’s reauthorization in 1997 provided the vehicle
for passage of the Food and Drug Administration Modernization
Act, which permitted drug approval based on a single phase 3
clinical trial (instead of two), created the Fast-Track program for
facilitating the development and expediting the review of drugs
for treatment of serious or life-threatening conditions, and
established the use of surrogate endpoints in clinical trials, among
other things.72
Concerns about declining FDA standards for drug approvals
were raised by some FDA staff following PDUFA’s enactment.
For example, in a 1998 anonymous survey study of FDA medical
officers conducted by Public Citizen’s Health Research Group,
among the 53 medical officers who responded to the survey (out
of 172 officers to whom the survey had been mailed), 17 described
the then-current standards for the review of drug safety and
efficacy as being “lower” or “much lower” than those in existence
prior to 1995, and 34 stated that there was “somewhat greater”
70.

Prescription Drug User Fee Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-571.

71.

U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., FISCAL YEAR 2021 JUSTIFICATION
ESTIMATES FOR APPROPRIATIONS COMMITTEES (2021).

72.

PETER LURIE & SIDNEY M. WOLFE, FDA MEDICAL OFFICERS
REPORT LOWER STANDARDS PERMIT DANGEROUS DRUG
APPROVALS: A PUBLIC CITIZEN’S HEALTH RESEARCH GROUP
REPORT 2 (1998) [hereinafter LOWER STANDARDS]; Food and Drug
Administration Modernization Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-115,
111 Stat. 2296.
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or “much greater” pressure to approve a greater proportion of
drugs than there was before 1995.73 Likewise, a 2003 HHS OIG
report found that among 136 CDER reviewers surveyed, 36%
were not confident in FDA decisions regarding the safety of a
drug.74
Most importantly, the introduction of user fees gradually
resulted in a fundamental shift in the relationship between the
FDA and the regulated pharmaceutical industry, such that the
agency came to view drug companies as partners, rather than
regulated entities. FDA leaders for several years now have been
transparent about the agency’s partnership with industry. For
example, in a 2014 speech to drug company executives then-FDA
Commissioner Margaret Hamburg touted a “new era of
partnership” with the biopharmaceutical industry.75
Partnerships involve close cooperation between two or more
entities seeking to advance shared interests and objectives. But
the dynamics of a partnership are incompatible with the
relationship that should exist between a regulatory agency and
regulated industry. The pharmaceutical industry’s primary
interest is to maximize profits selling drugs, which can conflict
with what should be the FDA’s primary interest: protecting
public health.
In 2018, ProPublica published an exposé describing the
deeply entrenched industry-friendly culture within the FDA.76 It
reported that, according to former agency employees, as the FDA
became more reliant on industry user fees to pay for drug reviews,
it showed an increasing inclination to approve new drugs and
73.

LOWER STANDARDS, supra note 72, at 3.

74.

DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUM. SERV. OFF. INSPECTOR GEN., FDA’S
REVIEW PROCESS FOR NEW DRUG APP., PUB. OEI-01-01-00590
(2003).

75.

Robert Weisman, FDA Chief Urges ‘New Era of Partnership,’ BOS.
GLOBE (Apr. 5, 2014), http://www.bostonglobe.com/business/
2014/04/04/fda-commissioner-calls-for-new-era-partnership-withbiopharma-industry/8676GZuMw8oEqaXt2HmkmK/story.html
[https://perma.cc/4XBD-LPB5].
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adopted an industry-friendly posture.77 For example, one former
FDA medical team leader told ProPublica that FDA staff know
“you don’t get promoted unless you’re pro-industry.” 78
As we told the HHS OIG in a July 13, 2021, follow-up letter,
during Dr. Woodcock’s leadership of CDER over the past three
decades, the relationship between the FDA and the
pharmaceutical industry grew ever cozier — resulting in
regulatory capture on the part of the agency.79 She undoubtedly
helped foster the current culture at CDER that permitted and
encouraged the type of inappropriately close collaboration that
occurred between the FDA and Biogen and ultimately corrupted
the integrity of the FDA’s review of aducanumab for the
treatment of Alzheimer’s disease. Thus, the OIG must examine
her role in this matter.
I close with this cartoon summing up the current state of the
FDA and its relationship with the pharmaceutical industry and
the potential resulting harm to patients that was posted on
Twitter in response to Dr. Woodcock’s July 9 tweet calling for an
OIG investigation of the agency’s review and approval of
aducanumab.80
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Letter from Michael A. Carome, Director, Pub. Citizen’s Health
Rsch. Group, to Christie A. Grimm, Inspector General (July 13,
2021) (on file with Pub. Citizen’s Health Rsch. Grp.).
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Matt Carmody, Cartoon of FDA in Bed with Drug Companies (c)
2004, in TUESDAY’S HORSE (Nov. 10, 2014), https://tuesdayshorse.
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perma.cc/E24D-BHNA]. Links to all our advocacy work related to
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